This article points out that one country two systems in Hong Kong is finally dead. I copied down below the entire document with google translated version along with it.
The announcement of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee that just ended, and the subsequent interpretation of the announcement by Shen Chunyao, director of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Law Committee, clearly indicate that the CCP will gradually start to create Deng Xiaoping. “One country, two systems” is undergoing a comprehensive transformation.
The announcement of the meeting itself has only two simple sentences: First, “strictly governing Hong Kong and Macao in accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law.” Second, it is necessary to “establish a sound legal system and enforcement mechanism for special administrative regions to safeguard national security.” . After the meeting, Shen Chunyao further revealed at the press conference that the plenary session clearly proposed a five-point policy when discussing the Hong Kong issue (see the appendix of this article for details). The author thinks that there are the following points worth noting.
First, the original text of the communique does not mention “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, a high degree of autonomy”, but directly talks about the central government’s governance of Hong Kong.
“Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong and a high degree of autonomy” are included in the Sino-British international treaty document “The Sino-British Joint Declaration” and Hong Kong’s constitutional document “Basic Law”. It is the smooth transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty and the importance of Hong Kong people not resisting the return. The basis of the “social contract”. In the first five years of the reunification, the CCP basically abide by this commitment, but without turning around, it began to think about how to intervene in Hong Kong’s governance. The process is as follows:
- Starting from the demonstration of 500,000 citizens in 2003, the CCP began with propaganda to spread the public opinion that Hong Kong needs central governance. For example, its most commonly used argument is that in 1997 only sovereignty was withdrawn and no power was withdrawn; in 1997, only the nominal return of the law, there was no return to political substance; in 1997, Hong Kong returned, but the hearts of Hong Kong people did not return. . . . . Wait, this actually reflects the CCP’s impulsiveness to govern Hong Kong.
- By 2007, the Liaison Office of the Liaison Office officially proposed the idea of ”establishing a second governance team.” This is the first time the CCP has indicated that it has to intervene in the governance of Hong Kong. However, when it was proposed, it was known that it violated the Basic Law. Therefore, it was a slap in the face. It was only a personal “learning experience”. It was inconvenient and straightforward. Proposed.
3. 到2009年，北京清華大學法學院副教授程潔（曾經參與全國人大常委基本法工作）在美國卡內基刊物 Hong Kong Journal（2009年秋季號）上發表文章，題目是「一個新政策的故事」（The Story of a New Policy），明確無誤地指出中國對香港政治「失去耐性」，從此「中央變得更為積極參與香港的政治、對港政策從過去偏重「一國兩制」中的「兩制」﹐變成現在更為重「一國」。
- In 2009, Cheng Jie, an associate professor at the Tsinghua University School of Law in Beijing (who was involved in the Basic Law of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress) published an article in the Carnegie Journal of the United States, the Hong Kong Journal (Autumn 2009), entitled “The Story of a New Policy “The Story of a New Policy” clearly and unambiguously points out that China has “lost patience” against Hong Kong politics. From then on, “the central government has become more active in Hong Kong’s politics. The policy toward Hong Kong has shifted from the past to the “two systems” of “one country, two systems”. It has become more important now to “one country.”
- By 2014, the Chinese Communist Party threw out a white paper entitled “One Country, Two Systems” in the Practice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It first proposed that the central government has the concept of “full governance” in Hong Kong. The original “high degree of autonomy” was imposed with new restrictions: “High degree of autonomy is not Full autonomy.”
- Finally, the Fourth Plenary Session of this year (2019) simply bluntly said that it would “respect the administration of Hong Kong” and no longer mention “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong and a high degree of autonomy”.
This process shows that the CCP has always been thinking about how to directly rule Hong Kong. This kind of thinking has been brewing for 17 years. It is not because of the anti-delivery regulations.
Second, the communique proposes to “establish a sound legal system and enforcement mechanism for special administrative regions to safeguard national security.”
Many people have already pointed out that this means that the CCP will soon take the initiative to legislate for Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong. According to the provisions of the Basic Law, Article 23 is “self-legislated” by Hong Kong. For reasons that are well known, Hong Kong has so far lacked an appropriate political environment to enact legislation (which the Lin Zhengyue government recognizes). Under this circumstance, the mainland scholars think that the central government directly legislates for the SAR (national security involves national defense, The SAR has no right to question the name.) The central government directly declares that the “China National Security Law” and the “Anti-Secession Law” are directly applicable to Hong Kong. (It is only necessary for the NPC Standing Committee to decide to include the law in Annex III of the Basic Law. ). It is still not clear what step Beijing will take, but what is certain is that Hong Kong faces increasing pressure on 23 legislations.
In addition to legislation (whether it is 23 or the national security law introduced into the mainland), the announcement also mentions the establishment of a sound “execution mechanism.” There are also several possible ways to do this: First, the political department of the Hong Kong police has been restored. The government has discussed a lot in the past. This is the least volatile practice. The second is to expand the existing representative of the Central Public Security Department in Hong Kong (the existing “Policy Liaison Department” in the Liaison Office) and give certain enforcement powers. Strictly speaking, the organization currently has no law enforcement power in Hong Kong. However, from the recent police violent incidents, it has been suspected that the fragments of law enforcement by the mainland armed police in Hong Kong have been photographed by the media. It can be seen that the CCP has begun to enforce directly in Hong Kong. At present, this practice is in violation of the Basic Law. In the future, this is likely to be legalized. The third is to set up a new institution in Hong Kong by national security. It is connected with the National Security Council and even the higher-level National Security Council. It specializes in handling cases involving national security. If this step is finally taken, the shock to Hong Kong will be great. .
Third, Shen Chunyao added that it is necessary to improve the system and mechanism for the appointment and removal of the Chief Executive and principal officials of the SAR.
How the Chief Executive and principal officials are appointed, the Basic Law has already stipulated that in the past, the election of the Chief Executive, Beijing can safely let everyone choose by controlling the election committee of the small circle. Therefore, the first and second term chief executives, Beijing’s appointments are all formally exercising appointments. However, in the 2017 Chief Executive Election, the three candidates (Lin Zheng, Zeng Junhua, and Hu Guoxing) were all elected in accordance with the Basic Law and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the election of the Chief Executive. Their eligibility for election is in full compliance with the Basic Law and the Constitution. But even then, because of the three people, Zeng Junhua not only has the highest popularity, but also the most popular among the election committees in the small circle. Therefore, if the 1200 election committee is free to choose, it is absolutely impossible to get Lin Zheng. Under this circumstance, the CCP has said through various channels that if the elected people do not meet the central will, then the central government has the right not to appoint. As a result, many members of the election committee knew how to make Lin Zheng “elected” with 777 votes. The current practice in Beijing is to legalize and regularize this practice of directly assigning chief executives. This is a serious violation of the original intention of the Basic Law.
In addition to the special appointments directly from Beijing, the appointment of appointments to key officials will be made in the future. How the principal officials were appointed, the provisions of the Basic Law are: nominations for chief executives, appointments by the central government. The nomination is in the chief executive and the central appointment is procedural or non-substantive. Although the author knows that since the Liang Zhenying era, Beijing has been intervening in his cabinet formation process. Many people are “nominated” by Leung Chun-ying after they have been interviewed in Shenzhen. But after all, this is not a justification. Now Beijing may feel that it is no longer necessary to go back. According to Shen Chunyao’s explanation, it is very likely that the appointment of the principal officials will be directly decided by the central government. The process of forming the chief executive is nominal. The cabinet is actually decided by Beijing. Raised on. In this way, the “nomination power” given to the Chief Executive by the Basic Law will be reduced to “the right to be notified”.
Fourth, in the future, the “Interpretation of Law” of the National People’s Congress may be institutionalized and constant, and the right of final adjudication of Hong Kong will be substantially cancelled.
In the past, the CCP adopted a more restrained attitude toward the “interpretation of the law” of the National People’s Congress. Every time the interpretation of the law was emphasized, it was a last resort. However, according to Shen Chunyao’s supplementary explanation, the Fourth Plenary Session proposed to “improve” the interpretation system of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which means that the interpretation of the NPC may become institutionalized and constant. There are two risks to this development:
First, the CCP can more arbitrarily modify the spirit of the Basic Law without modifying the text of the Basic Law, so that it can plausibly call itself “in strict accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law.” In fact, we have witnessed in the past 22 years how it has ruined the spirit of the Basic Law without changing the word “Basic Law”. If it does not do this repeatedly, today will not inspire the public to be so angry.
二是中共實質上把人大常委會變成過去殖民地時代的樞密院，實質地取消香港終審權。英國法律系統中的樞密院扮演終審庭的角色（回歸前，香港的終審案均在英國上議院的樞密院司法委員會 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council）審理。按照《基本法》的規定。回歸後香港擁有終審權。但是，一旦人大釋法成為制度化和恒常化，則香港終審法院任何裁決如果不合京意時，人大使出一招釋法就可以否決香港終審法院的裁決，變成實質的樞密院。屆時香港的所謂終審權就會化為烏有，只剩下紙面上的裝飾品而已。
Second, the CCP essentially changed the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress into the Privy Council of the past colonial era and substantially abolished the power of final adjudication in Hong Kong. The Privy Council in the English legal system plays the role of the Court of Final Appeal (before the reunification, the final case in Hong Kong was heard in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords). In accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law. After the reunification, Hong Kong has the right of final adjudication. However, once the NPC interpretation becomes institutionalized and constant, if the ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal does not conform to Beijing’s intention, the ambassador’s ambassador can veto the ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and become a substantive Privy Council. By then, the so-called final adjudication power in Hong Kong will be turned into nothing, leaving only the decorations on paper.
The Fourth Plenary Session has brought these bad news to Hong Kong. Hong Kong people cannot help but know that they cannot be prepared.
Appendix: Shen Chunyao elaborated on the discussion of the Hong Kong issue by the Fourth Plenary Session and proposed five guidelines:
First, adhere to the principle of administering Hong Kong and Macao according to law, safeguarding the constitutional order of the special administrative region as determined by the Constitution and the Basic Law, improving the system and mechanism related to the implementation of the Constitution and the Basic Law by the Special Administrative Region, and insisting on the “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” with the Patriots as the main body. “Our Australians governing Macao” to improve the level of governance in special administrative regions;
Second, improve the system and mechanism for the appointment and removal of the chief executives and principal officials of the special administrative region, the interpretation system of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Basic Law, and exercise the powers conferred on the central government by the Constitution and the Basic Law.
Third, establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanism for safeguarding national security, and support the SAR to strengthen law enforcement forces;
Fourth, improve the integration of Hong Kong and Macao into the overall situation of national development, complement the advantages of the Mainland and coordinate development, promote the construction of the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Dawan District, support Hong Kong’s development of the economy, improve people’s livelihood, and solve deep-seated problems;
Fifth, strengthen the constitution and basic law education, national education, Chinese history and Chinese culture education for Hong Kong and Macao society, especially public officials and young people, and enhance the national consciousness and patriotism of Hong Kong and Macao compatriots.
Shen Chunyao stressed that it is firmly committed to safeguarding the interests of national sovereign security and safeguarding the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macao. It will not tolerate any behavior that challenges the “one country, two systems” bottom line. It will not tolerate any separatist actions that endanger national security, and resolutely prevent and contain external forces from interfering in Hong Kong and Macao. Business, and split subversion infiltration and destruction activities.